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This definition retains the ontological dimension
of Packard and Clark’s conceptualization via (a) but
supplements this with a Ramseyean condition in (b).
Equivalently, any cases of uncertainty that fail to
satisfy (a) will involve aleatory uncertainty. Some
forms of aleatory uncertainty are mitigable pace
Packard and Clark and a similar Ramseyean condition must be met if the agent seeks to manage
downside outcomes. It is worth noting that the
probabilistic nature of aleatory risk permits the development and sale of instruments (insurance, futures, options...) to mitigate the outcomes of this
uncertainty. The markets for these instruments permit the agent to easily calculate the mitigation cost
against their subjective utility, given their subjective
probability distribution.
We shall argue that this hybrid view of the
epistemic–aleatory distinction includes three significant virtues. First, the hybrid account avoids the
dilemma that was shown to confront epistemic uncertainty. The incorporation of (b) into the definition
provides a clear and non-arbitrary way of delimiting
and fixing the domain epistemic uncertainty. Notice
that this will generally hold for cases of uncertainty
which stem from highly complex causally deterministic systems: the greater the complexity, the higher
the costs of resolution. So, these cases are more
properly diagnosed as cases of immitigable uncertainty on the hybrid view, though not aleatory.
Second, the hybrid account maintains the ontological flavor of Packard and Clark’s original definition by
retaining the causally deterministic–indeterministic
criterion. The account is ontological and avoids
attempting to define uncertainty in wholly epistemic or
mind-dependent terms, even though the consequent
choice problem is mind-dependent.
Third, the hybrid account makes the kind of uncertainty in question sensitive to context. Rather than
imagining what gods could do in principle and thus
over-idealizing in an implausible way, this view offers
an additional contextual element (agential cost) for
characterizing uncertainty. This is more plausible than
a “one-size-fits-all” conception. In scenarios in which
time is scarce and the dissolution of uncertainty imposes a high cost, a manager may very well deem uncertainty about outcomes to be immitigable, whereas
this uncertainty may concern a causally deterministic
process and be mitigable if time was more ample. Inclusion of these contextual factors greatly enhances the
viability of the definition.
Packard and Clark (2020) have undertaken an important project for management and strategy, providing a needed basis for categorizing the varieties of
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uncertainty in an ontological way. We follow them in
acknowledging the necessity of this venture. We are
hopeful that the proposal presented herein is a supplement that will prove useful to their project.
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Mitigating versus Managing Epistemic and
Aleatory Uncertainty
We are grateful for Holmes and Westgren’s (2020)
thoughtful response to our recent article (Packard &
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Clark, 2020a). In it, they argued that “a mitigability–
immitigability axis does not map well onto the
aleatory–epistemic uncertainty axis” (p. 7). This
challenge to our delineation casts doubt to its usefulness in strategic theorizing, as we have supposed.
They thus proposed a revision to our definitions that
encapsulates epistemic uncertainty within the confines of the present state of knowledge and the costs
of acquiring such knowledge, allowing strategic
analysis of the value of mitigation efforts to be more
clearly assessed. While we are open minded toward
such a revision to our framework, we do not see
the proposed revision as a clear advancement over
our original model, for reasons that we shall here
expound.
UNCERTAINTY MITIGATION
VERSUS MANAGEMENT
A key point, especially in light of Holmes and
Westgren’s critique, that was abridged in our original
article is the distinction between mitigating uncertainty itself and mitigating its consequences. In our
article, we pointed to two ways of dealing with uncertainty: mitigation and coping (Packard & Clark,
2020a: 767–768). Consider, for example, an airline
that is concerned about the prospect of a rise in oil
prices. “Mitigation” refers to reducing the uncertainty through information gathering—the airline
could monitor events in various oil-producing
countries so as to have lower uncertainty about
what will happen. It could also or instead “cope
with” or manage the uncertainty’s consequences by,
for instance, implementing an oil hedge, thereby reducing the financial impact of the feared price rise.
When strategic managers employ, for example, a
real options strategy, have they thereby reduced or
mitigated uncertainty? Our primary assertion is that
uncertainty mitigation strategies are only possible
for epistemic uncertainties, and not for aleatory uncertainties. Purchasing futures, diversifying investments, and so forth are techniques for managing the
consequences of uncertainty. While the underlying
uncertainty itself is not mitigated through such
strategies, the risks1 can be. This distinction requires
that we accept a further distinction between “ontological uncertainty,” which references an indeterminate state of affairs (e.g., Knight, 1921), and
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“subjective uncertainty,”2 which references a state of
mind (e.g., Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). We will return
to this distinction again later, but, to summarize, we
focused on the former in accordance with so-called
“Knightian uncertainty,” which was the focus of the
special issue.
Strategic action cannot reduce aleatory uncertainty—
what one does within the context of aleatory uncertainty
has no effect on the underlying uncertainty per se, which,
by definition, stands outside the reach of human action.
Strategic actions do not mitigate this uncertainty but only
the risks that accompany it. This is the essence of effectuation theory, for instance, which attempts to help the
actor more effectively bear and navigate the uncertainty.
In contrast, epistemic uncertainties are within an actor’s
grasp and can be reduced. Thus, while “one may argue
that we have mitigated a large number of aleatory risks”
(Holmes & Westgren, 2020: 870), such an argument must
come from a confusion of what we mean by “aleatory” or
what we mean by “mitigation,” or both.
ON THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ALEATORY
AND EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY
Holmes and Westgren’s (2020) primary argument
is a criticism of our boundary between epistemic and
aleatory uncertainties. We defined “epistemic uncertainties” as those that are mitigable—even if presently unable to do so—and “aleatory uncertainties” as
those that are not. But, Holmes and Westgren noted,
because some epistemic uncertainties are so complex
as to disallow their mitigation given current capabilities, they share more in common with aleatory uncertainties. In our article, we added to complexity also
dynamism and stochasticity, which too can disallow
prediction or mitigation given the current state of
technology (Packard & Clark, 2020a: 769–770). To the
deciding actor, Holmes and Westgren observed, there
is no meaningful difference between innately immitigable aleatory uncertainty and practicably immitigable
epistemic uncertainty. Thus, they suggested bringing
the boundary of epistemic uncertainty within the confines of presently available information—that is, to
define uncertainty as epistemic if it can be mitigated
cost effectively with presently available information,
and as aleatory if it cannot.
We find this proposition intriguing and remain
open to the revision. However, though the revision is
We use “subjective” rather than “epistemic” (see
Berglund, Bousfiha, & Mansoori, 2020: 31) to distinguish it
from the aleatory/epistemic distinction we discuss in our
article.
2

We use “risk” here not in the Knightian sense, but in the
sense of what stands to be lost in some uncertain action, as
in “financial risk.”
1
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advantageous in some respects, it is disadvantaged in
others. While the boundary that Holmes and Westgren have drawn includes the costs of mitigation, we
note that our original framework already included
mitigation costs as a theoretical (but not definitional)
boundary (see Packard & Clark, 2020a: 775–777, as
well as Figure 4). Specifically, when dealing with
epistemic uncertainty, determining which strategic
logic to employ depends on the cost of information
gathering required to mitigate the uncertainty. But,
while we acknowledge assessed costs as a key factor,
we hesitate to make such costs the basis of a definitional boundary in theoretical uncertainty types.
One of the key drawbacks to this revision is that it
cannot clearly account for discoverable information.
It is not always clear whether yet undiscovered information is right around the corner or eons away.
That ancient sky-gazers found the prediction of certain astronomical phenomena (e.g., a lunar eclipse)
to be impossible does not mean that such a phenomenon is, in fact, truly unpredictable, as we have
since shown through scientific advancement. Thus,
the cost-based boundary that Holmes and Westgren
proposed is blurry, subjective, and mutable—how
much might information that we have not yet discovered cost? The analysis that such a boundary
promotes would be overly exclusive of the potential
for discovering new information and would steer
managers away from considering innovative information discovery as a viable path forward.
Of course, Holmes and Westgren astutely pointed
out that our own dividing line between aleatory and
epistemic uncertainty types is also not immutable, as
some uncertainty that now, to us, appears aleatory
may turn out to be epistemic. In essence, we agree.
We admit that we cannot always know, a priori,
whether an uncertainty is, in fact, epistemic or aleatory. Ours is a nuanced stance in which we begin by
assessing the underlying reasons why something is
unknown. Is it because it is, philosophically, unknowable, or is it because we currently lack the capabilities to fully gather information that is, in
principle, knowable? Thus, we accept that information is knowable unless there are underlying principles that point toward that information not existing
or as fundamentally inaccessible. This is different
from the aforementioned problems of complexity,
dynamism, and stochasticity, which are mere impediments to knowability. There are, for instance,
cases in which the scientific advancements we have
made suggest that a definitive prediction is and must
always remain beyond us. Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle, for example, is one such. The curious case
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of free will is, as we have argued, another. Where
there is reason to accept fundamental indeterminism,
assumptions of aleatory uncertainty are appropriate.
Thus, all assumed cases of aleatory uncertainty ultimately rest on philosophical assumptions of indeterminism that have, admittedly, been disputed.
Our argument for the treatment of, at least, free will
as a source of aleatory uncertainty is also based on
practical and ethical grounds. The assumption that
free will is real until proven otherwise is advantageous for several reasons. Not only does promotion
of human determinism lead to negative social and
ethical outcomes broadly, more specifically, it could
lead to bad business strategies. If we believe that people
are predictable, we are inclined toward investing in
projects such as “big data” and analytics to determine
strategy. Our accepting free will as a first cause, however,
implies a warning against overreliance on positivist–
reductionist research paradigms and pervasive societal
techno-optimism (Clark, Robert, & Hampton, 2016).
Predictive analytics may not be as promising as
widely supposed (see Broussard, 2018); if human
action is, in fact, a source of aleatory uncertainty,
predictions of behavior will always be limited, no
matter how “big” the data are. Predictive successes of
the past are unable to guarantee future success, as it is
always possible for human actors to change their
minds and preferences.
SUBJECTIVE UTILITY THEORY AND
ITS DRAWBACKS
Ultimately, Holmes and Westgren have proffered
subjective utility theory (Ramsey, 1931; Savage,
1954) as a way of better understanding uncertainty
and its mitigation. We are sympathetic to a shift
toward a subjective uncertainty concept where uncertainty does not reference a property of some ontological state of affairs but rather a subjective state
of mind. However, while Holmes and Westgren’s
(2020) notion of uncertainty as a subjective “degree
of belief” (p. 871) in a particular knowledge claim is
highly relevant to the judgment process, such subjective uncertainty is derivative of the ontological
uncertainties we discussed in our article. In other
words, ontological or environmental uncertainty
(indeterminism) has a causal influence on how
uncertain one becomes about the environment.
These distinct notions of uncertainty are causally
interrelated, but not equivalent—aleatory and epistemic uncertainty are ontological uncertainties,
and not subjective uncertainties, which derive
therefrom.
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In the case of epistemic uncertainty, such as
Holmes and Westgren’s example of whether it will
rain today, a probability can be ascribed, albeit subjectively inasmuch as uncertainty remains. Whether
or not to act toward mitigating the uncertainty hinges
on the costs of information gathering versus simply
bearing or otherwise coping with the uncertainty, as
Holmes and Westgren (2020) (and Ramsey, 1931)
aptly point out (see also Figure 4 in Packard & Clark,
2020a). In such cases, labeled “ambiguity” elsewhere
(e.g., Packard, Clark, & Klein, 2017), even though one
ascribes a subjective probability to the outcome, that
probability is (or may be) discounted because it is
unknown whether the subjective probability is accurate (Ellsberg, 1961). Thus, a plausible choice option is to defer action until more information can be
garnered (Dhar, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992).
In the case of aleatory uncertainty, however,
Knight’s (1921) point that such probabilities do not
exist applies. Subjective probabilities can be ascribed to imagined possibilities, as put forth by
subjective utility theory—one can say that there is a
30% chance Sue will go bowling today. But, in reality, such probability ascriptions are imprecise and
often border on the nonsensical. While it is possible
that Sue goes bowling, there is no probability distribution for that outcome. In fact, Sue’s option and
outcome sets are open and infinite—there are endless opportunities that Sue could instead act upon
(Packard et al., 2017). To ascribe a specific probability of 30% is fallacious (Packard & Clark, 2020b).
There can be no probabilities for open or infinite sets.
Thus, in the case of aleatory uncertainty, neither
information gathering nor fallacious guesses at
numbers mitigate the uncertainty. Asking Sue her
intentions might reduce your subjective uncertainty
but fails to inform some actual probability distribution, and nor does it inform about any portion of what
is unknowable. The necessarily remaining aleatory
uncertainty must simply be borne (e.g., managed)
or not.
Most real-world decisions comprise both aleatory
and epistemic uncertainties, and information gathering
can be useful to mitigate the epistemic uncertainties of
the decision (see Figure 3 in Packard & Clark, 2020a).
But any aleatory uncertainties are immitigable a priori
and must be borne or managed or avoided. Sue may
decide to go bowling and, thus, resolve the uncertainty.
But, until she does, you cannot know. The astute theorist might further observe that, until she has finally
acted, there is still opportunity for Sue to change her
mind. Thus, some aleatory uncertainty remains even
between the space of decision and action, if any. If your
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decision depends on Sue’s action, you must bear (e.g.,
manage) that uncertainty—it cannot be mitigated.
In short, we reject subjective utility theory as a
foundation for uncertainty theory, as its applicability
is limited to conditions of epistemic uncertainty
only. It falls apart quickly and quite completely in the
face of aleatory uncertainty. For such cases, we find
Shackle’s (1949, 1969) theory of potential surprise to
be much more apposite.
CONCLUSION
We were pleased to read Holmes and Westgren’s
(2020) response. Their efforts toward an improved
boundary between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty pushed our thinking toward new levels of
practicality. We are open to further conversation, as
drawing the line as we did at the bounds of mitigability in principle does, as they assert, put a lot of
weight on epistemic uncertainty and may have cast
the “net of epistemic uncertainty too widely”
(Holmes & Westgren, 2020: 870). If we mapped the
types atop the Knightian distinction between ambiguity and uncertainty, their hybrid boundary, and
not ours, maps better, and there may be merit to advancing such a proposition as a way to understand
Knight’s work at a more profound level. If such were
our goal, we might concede.
However, our real goal was more contentious than
that. Our aim was to assert the reality of true indeterminism and to examine its strategic effects. To
date, science has been predisposed toward supposing the knowability of all things. This predisposition
has, we fear, too often misled rather than informed,
and is a likely contributor to the academic–
practitioner divide. For example, Harrison (1977)
observed that managers found the probabilistic decision models of academia to be unrealistic and impractical for real-world business decision-making.
We agree. It is time to take indeterminism and aleatory uncertainty seriously if we are to improve the
value of our practicable advice to business strategists
and decision-makers.
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